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Abstract
International migration is an important determinant of institutions, not
considered so far in the development literature. Using cross-sectional and panel
estimation for a large sample of developing countries, we nd that openness to
emigration (as measured by the natives average emigration rate) has a positive
e¤ect on home-country institutional development (as measured by standard
democracy indices). The results are robust to a wide range of specications
and identication methods. Remarkably, the cross-sectional estimates are fully
in line with the implied long-run relationship from dynamic panel regressions.
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1 Introduction
Recent research has emphasized the importance of institutions for comparative devel-
opment (e.g., Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2005; Rodrik, 2007) and explored
the determinants of institutions. This paper emphasizes the role of emigration in
determining institutions, building on cross-country comparisons for a large set of
developing countries over the last thirty years.
Figure 1 shows a close association between emigration and standard indicators of
democracy over the period 1980-2010 (for the full set of developing countries): the
Freedom Houses indices of political rights (PR) and civil liberties (CL) increased by
53 and 60 percent, respectively; the Simon Fraser Institutes index of Economic Free-
dom of the World (EF) and the Polity IV Projects index of democracy (P2) increased
by 35 and 116 percent. During the same period, the average emigration rate of devel-
oping countries was multiplied by 2.13. This paper investigates whether the positive
relationship between openness to emigration and institutional development holds once
we control for a number of important variables (such as human capital, income per
capita, ethnic fractionalization, trade openess, as well as geographic characteristics)
that have been shown to determine institutions, and also survives the introduction
of regional xed-e¤ects. Moreover, we investigate whether the relationship between
emigration and democracy can receive a causal interpretation.
Figure 1. Democracy and emigration rates over time (1980-2010)
Notes. Four democracy indices are normalized between 0 and 1 and measured on the left scale: PR
= Freedom Houses index of Polical Rights; Democracy indices; CL = Freedom Houses index of
Civil Liberties; EF = Simon Fraser Institutes index of Economic Freedom of the World; and P2 =
Polity IV Projects index of democracy (Polity 2). Emigration rate: Emig = stock of emigrants
divided by the native population (Brucker et al., 2013). For each indicator, we compute the mean
levels of all developing countries in a balanced sample (World Bank classication).
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We rst assess the e¤ect of emigration on institutional quality in OLS regressions,
relying on both cross-sectional and dynamic panel regressions. Obviously, there are
a number of identication issues that need to be addressed when looking at the e¤ect
of emigration on institutions. First among them is reverse causality; the direction
of the bias, however, is theoretically uncertain: more democratic countries can "let
their people go" more easily, while lack of democracy constitutes a strong push factor
for emigration. Second, there may be omitted factors in our regressions that drive
the joint patterns of emigration and institutions. It could be argued, for example,
that trade and migration are complements while trade can also a¤ect institutional
quality. Here again, the direction of the bias would seem uncertain, at least if one
follows Rigobon and Rodrik (2005) who found a weak e¤ect of trade on institutions
(with heterogeneous e¤ects across institutional indicators).
We address these endogeneity issues using an instrumental variable approach. We
rely on three complementary IV strategies: i) a gravity model predicting a countrys
emigration rate out of a set of reasonably exogenous dyadic variables (these are in-
teracted with time dummies in the dynamic panel regressions); we supplement this
approach with ii) weather-based instruments (associated to an indicator of country
size), and iii) internal instruments using SYS-GMM estimation. These three com-
plementary IV strategies yield consistent results, reveal a downward bias of OLS
estimates (i.e., once reverse causality from bad institutions to low emigration is ac-
counted for, the magnitude of the emigration coe¢cient is increased), and support a
careful causal interpretation of the results.
Our main result is that openness to emigration promotes democratization at home:
we uncover a positive and signicant e¤ect of emigration on various measures of insti-
tutional quality in a large sample of developing countries. This e¤ect is robust across
specications and estimation methods (OLS and IV), with consistent estimates in
the cross-section and dynamic panel frameworks. Two second-order results are also
worth mentioning. First, there are heterogeneous results across democracy indica-
tors. More precisely, the main result holds mostly for our three de facto indicators
of institutional quality: the Freedom Houses "Polical Rights" and "Civil Liberties"
indicators, and the Simon Fraser Institutes "Economic Freedom of the World" indi-
cator, but not for the "Polity 2" indicator of the Polity IV Project, an indicator of de
jure institutional quality. And second, the e¤ect is fully driven by emigration to rich,
highly democratic countries, suggesting that the e¤ect of emigration on home-country
institutional outcomes is destination-specic. Indeed, when we use alternative migra-
tion data sources allowing to disentangle the e¤ect of emigration to OECD versus
non-OECD destinations, the e¤ect of emigration to the latter is virtually zero.
The paper most closely related to ours is Spilimbergo (2009), who also adopts a
cross-country approach and shows that foreign-trained students promote democracy
at home if foreign education was acquired in democratic countries. While he does
not identify the mechanisms that drive his results, he suggests a number of possible
channels (e.g., access to foreign media, acquisition of norms and values while abroad
3
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that di¤use at home upon return, willingness to preserve the quality of ones network
abroad, etc.) that can be generalized to other migration experiences as well. Our
paper is similar in spirit and execution, with important conceptual di¤erences. First,
we estimate the e¤ect of emigration on home-country institutions for all migrants,
not just foreign students, meaning that we proceed to a larger scale exercise. Sec-
ond, Spilimbergos data contains information on the number of people with foreign
training living either abroad or in the home country, making it impossible to know
whether the e¤ect is due to those staying abroad or to those who returned. In con-
trast, our emigration variable consists of the lagged accumulated stock of individuals
(aged 25+) born in the home country and living abroad, suggesting that the e¤ect
of emigration on democracy needs not be driven by return migration. Third, iden-
tication in Spilimbergos paper fully relies on heterogeneous e¤ects for democratic
versus non-democratic destinations. We supplement this identication strategy us-
ing di¤erent IV approaches, as mentioned above and explained in detail in Section 2
below. Fourth, Spilimbergo nds consistent results only for his "democratic norm at
destination" variable, a weighted average of democratic scores at destination which
captures whether emigration is directed toward more or less democratic countries. In
all his specications but one, the interaction term between the number of students
abroad and the "democratic norm" is not signicant. In contrast, our main results are
for the emigration rate, suggesting that how open a country is to emigration makes a
di¤erence, not just whether its emigration is directed toward destinations with higher
or lower democracy scores. Incidentally but quite importantly, this also allows us to
interpret the magnitude of the estimated e¤ects.
Other related literature includes mostly political-economy models of the interac-
tion between migration and rent-seeking1 as well as country case-studies trying to
identify specic channels through which migration a¤ects home-country institutions:
the "exit e¤ect" à la Hirschman (1970), whereby emigration options (and related ex-
pected remittances) reduce the incentives to "voice";2 the role of diasporas and their
attempts to a¤ect home-country politics, for good or bad;3 and the di¤usion of de-
mocratic values and norms acquired by the migrants while abroad and transferred to
the home country, be it directly, through return migration and contacts with relatives
abroad or indirectly, through the broader scope of social networks.
In particular, two recent micro studies found supportive evidence of a democracy-
di¤usion e¤ect of emigration. In the context of Cape Verde, Batista and Vicente
(2011) took advantage of a survey on perceived corruption in public services to set
1The idea of migration as a personal response to political and economic repression has a long
tradition in economics and political science (see Vaubel, 2008). Recent political economy models
of the interaction between emigration, institutions and development include Esptein et al. (1999),
Docquier and Rapoport (2003), Mariani (2007) and Wilson (2011).
2For example, it is commonly argued that emigration to the United States contributed to delay
political change in countries such as Mexico (e.g., Hansen, 1988) or Haiti (e.g., Fergusson, 2003).
3See for example Haney and Vanderbush (1999) on Cuba, Ragazzi (2009) on Croatia and Wilson
(1995) on Northern-Ireland.
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up the following experiment: survey respondents were asked to mail a pre-stamped
postcard if they wanted the results of the survey to be made publicly available in the
national and international media. Controlling for individual, household and locality
characteristics, Batista and Vicente (2011) regressed response rates  which they
interpret as demand for accountability  on migration prevalence at the locality level.
They show that current as well as return migrants signicantly increase participation
rates, and more so for the latter. Interestingly, they nd that only migrants to the
US seem to make an impact, while migrants to Portugal, the other main destination,
do not. The other context we report on is Moldova, a former Soviet Republic with
virtually no emigration before the Russian crisis of 1998 and that, since then, has
seen a surge in migration outows, estimated at half-a-million for a population of
3.6 million in 2008. Omar Mahmoud et al. (2014) take advantage of the quasi-
experimental context of Moldova, of the possibility of controlling for pre-migration
political preferences, and of the fact that Moldovan emigration was directed both
to the more democratic European Union and to less democratic Russia to identify
destination-specic e¤ects. They nd that past emigration to the West translates into
signicantly lower share of votes for the communist party at the community level and
provide suggestive evidence for an interpretation in terms of information and cultural
transmission channels.4
As in Spilimbergo (2009), however, we are unable to disentangle the di¤erent
channels through which emigration a¤ects democracy at home; rather, our methods
allow, and indeed force us to examine the overall impact of emigration on home-
country institutions. This is composed of the various direct and indirect channels
outlined above. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents
the empirical model, discusses the main challenges for the empirical analysis, and
describes the data. Section 3 presents the results. Section 4 concludes.
2 Empirical strategy
Our goal is to empirically investigate the e¤ect of emigration on the quality of insti-
tutions in the sending country. We will use several indicators of institutional quality,
Ii;t, and measures of emigration, mi;t, available for origin country i = 1; :::; N and
year t = 1; :::; T . In our benchmark regressions, the emigration rate is computed
as the sum of emigrants from country i to OECD destination countries j at time
t,
P
jMij;t, divided by the native population of country i, Ni;t (proxied by the sum
of the resident and emigrant populations). In this section we present our empirical
model (Section 2.1), discuss how we deal with endogeneity issues (Section 2.2), and
describe the data sources used for the empirical analysis (Section 2.3).
4See also Chauvet and Mercier (2014) on Mali.
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2.1 Model
Our empirical model features the quality of institutions as the dependent variable.
We augment the linear dynamic specication used in previous studies (e.g., Acemoglu
et al., 2005; Bobba and Coviello, 2007; Castello-Climent, 2008; Spilimbergo, 2009)
by adding the emigration rate to the set of explanatory variables:
Ii;t =  + Ii;t 1 + mi;t 1 +
X
k
kX
k
i;t 1 + "i;t (1)
where  is a constant. The lagged dependent variable enters the set of explana-
tory variables with coe¢cient  to account for persistence in institutional quality.
Our coe¢cient of interest, ; captures the short-run e¤ect of the emigration rate on
institutional quality at home. Xki;t 1 is a vector of K additional control variables
(k = 1; :::; K). The vector  includes parameters associated with the set of controls,
and captures their short-run e¤ect on institutional quality. All explanatory variables
are lagged by one period (one period represents ve years).
Our set of controls X covers the major determinants of democracy identied in
the existing empirical literature:
 Human capital (labeled as HumCap in the regression tables). Controlling for
human capital is important because changes in human capital can jointly a¤ect
the quality of institutions and emigration rates. This is because high-skilled in-
dividuals have a greater propensity to emigrate than the low-skilled, particularly
in developing countries. The literature on institutions and education provides
mixed results. Acemoglu et al. (2005) found no e¤ect of the average years of
schooling on education when country xed e¤ects are factored in. Account-
ing for persistency in institutions and human capital, Castello-Climente (2008)
found a positive e¤ect of the average level of education (for those below the 60th
percentile of the education distribution) over the period 1960-2000. Bobba and
Coviello (2007) found a positive e¤ect of the average years of schooling over the
period 1960-2000. Finally, Murtin and Wacziarg (2014) found a positive e¤ect
of primary schooling on democracy over the period 1870-2000. As our sample
covers the period 1980-2010, we will use the share of residents aged 25 and over
with tertiary (or college) education. This share is a good correlate/determinant
of democracy in most of our regressions.5
 Ethnic fractionalization (labeled as Ethnic), measured as the probability that
two randomly selected people from a given country belong to di¤erent ethnic
groups. Alesina et al. (2003) found that ethnic fractionalization is negatively
correlated with indicators of governance quality.
 Gross Domestic Product per capita (labeled as GDPpc) is used as a control
variable, as in most studies on institutions. We express it in logs.
5Other measures of human capital are used in the Appendix (see Table A.10).
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 Trade openness (labeled as Trade), measured as the sum of imports and ex-
ports as share of GDP. Trade is usually seen as the main indicator of openness.
We control for exports and imports to make sure that our emigration rates do
not capture other dimensions of openness. In addition, the existing literature
has revealed that good institutions are correlated with openness to trade (e.g.,
Rodrik et al., 2004).
 Net O¢cial Development Assistance as share of GNI (labeled as ODA). Using
data in the period 1960 to 1999, Djankov et al. (2008) recently argued that
foreign aid spurs rent-seeking behavior and has a negative impact on democracy.
 Legal Origin dummies (labeled as Legal). These variables identify the legal
origin of the Company Law and Commercial Code of each country. We use two
dummy variables, one for the English Common Law and one for the French
Commercial Code.6 We will also exclude socialist legal origin countries from
our sample in a robustness analysis.
 Geographic characteristics. The role of geography in explaining the choice of
institutions has been identied in several studies (e.g., Rodrik et al., 2004).
Here we use Sachs set of geographic indicators (Sachs, 2003): country latitude,
a dummy for landlocked countries, land area (logs), the percentage of a countrys
land area in the tropics, and the prevalence of malaria in 1994.
 Region dummies, added here to capture unobserved heterogeneity at the re-
gional level.
As is well known, a key issue when adding explanatory variables is that they
exhibit collinearity. For example, GDP per capita and human capital are highly
correlated, latitude is correlated with legal origin, and the emigration rate itself is
highly correlated with trade, human capital and many geographic variables. For this
reason, we will add one control (or set of controls) at a time, and show that our
results are robust to this procedure.
The dynamic specication (1) has been extensively used to explain the dynamics
of persistent variables such as the stock of human/physical capital or GDP per capita.
If the explanatory variables are persistent (e.g.,mi;t = mi;ss andXi;t = Xi;ss 8t, where
subscript ss stands for steady state) and if the coe¢cient of the lagged dependent is
comprised between 0 and 1 (i.e.,  2 [0; 1[), then the level of the dependent variable
converges towards a long-run or steady state level,
Ii;ss =
 + mi;ss + Xi;ss
1  
; (2)
6In our sample, there is no country identied as of the German or Scandinavian legal-origin type.
Hence, socialist countries form our reference group.
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which characterizes the long-run relationship between institutions and the right-hand-
side variables. In that case, =(1   ) captures the long-run e¤ect of emigration on
democracy.
Estimating (1) requires panel data while estimating (2) can be done in a cross-
sectional setting with one observation per country. Cross sectional and panel data
techniques have their pros and cons. In a cross-section framework, the underlying
steady-state assumption, albeit questionable, allows to circumvent the di¢culties
inherent to the endogeneity of the lagged dependent; however, in such framework the
omitted variable issue is likely to be severe. In a panel framework on the other hand,
we can characterize the transitional dynamics of institutional quality and better deal
with unobserved heterogeneity. However, we need to nd exogenous instruments that
are both country- and time-specic.
2.2 Identication strategy
We will rst estimate (2) and (1) using OLS or pooled OLS regressions, being aware
of the fact that such regressions raise a number of econometric issues that might
generate inconsistent estimates. The key issue when using cross-sectional or pooled
OLS regressions is the endogeneity of our main variable of interest, the emigration
rate. Endogeneity is due to a number of reasons. First, the quality of institutions is
likely to a¤ect both the desire to emigrate (as most people prefer to live in countries
with good institutions) and the possibility to emigrate (as bad institutions, or low
government e¤ectiveness, can be responsible for large administrative costs).7 This
means that a positive or negative correlation between emigration and institutional
quality can be driven by reverse causality. Second, unobserved country characteristics
can jointly a¤ect the emigration rate and the quality of institutions.
Causation is hard to establish with aggregate data. Our identication strategy
consists in comparing results obtained under three alternative sets of instruments and
to show that our IV results are robust to the instrumentation strategy. We rst use
a two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimation strategy. This requires nding suitable
instruments for migration in the rst stage. We consider two sets of external instru-
ments which have been commonly used in the migration literature, one based on a
"zero-stage" pseudo-gravity model, and one exploiting climatic factors. Then, follow-
ing Castello-Climente (2008), Bobba and Coviello (2007), and Murtin and Wacziarg
(2014), we will compare our results with those obtained with the system-GMM esti-
mator with internal instruments. The use of SYS-GMM enables us to better account
for unobservable heterogeneity and persistence in the lagged dependent and other
regressors.
7Fitzgerald et al. (2014) study the political pull factors of international migration in a gravity
framework.
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2.2.1 Gravity-based 2SLS strategy
Our main 2SLS identication strategy relies on Frankel and Romer (1999) and Feyrer
(2009). In the cross-sectional setting, we focus on the year 2000 and construct a
gravity-based prediction of bilateral migration stocks, cMij;00 from origin country i
to destination j. In this "zero-stage" gravity model, our set of determinants only
includes exogenous variables which are unlikely to directly impact democracy, i.e.
variables referred to as "relative geography" variables. We then obtain a predicted
emigration rate, bmi;00, by aggregating bilateral migration stocks over destinations,P
j
cMij;00, and by dividing that sum by the native population size in 2000, Ni;00. We
use this gravity-based predicted emigration rate to instrument mi;00 in our rst stage
regression (which includes Xki;00, the set of controls of the second stage):
mi;00 = a
gr
0
+ agr
1
bmi;00 +
X
k
agrk X
k
i;00 + 
gr
i;00 (3)
This method is now standard in the migration literature (e.g., Beine et al. 2013;
Ortega and Peri, 2014; Alesina et al., 2013; Docquier et al., 2014) and follows a long
tradition of predicting trade openness out of bilateral trade ows.
The gravity-based predictions of bilateral migration stocks are obtained from the
following pseudo-gravity model:
lnMij;00 = a0 + aj + b1Lingij + b2Guestij + b3 lnDistij + b4 lnPi;00 + ij;00 (4)
where Lingij is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the same language is spoken by at
least 9 percent of the population in both countries, Guestij is a dummy variable
equal to 1 if a guest-worker program after 1945 and before the 1980s was observed,
lnDistij is the log of the weighted distance that is equal to the distance between
i and j based on bilateral distances between the biggest cities of the two countries
(with those inter-city distances being weighted by the share of the city in the total
population of the country, see Head and Mayer (2002)), lnPi;00 represents the (log)
of the total population at origin in 2000, and aj is a destination-country xed e¤ect.
Our gravity model does not include origin-country xed e¤ects because the latter are
likely to capture the e¤ect of institutions on emigration decisions.8
The presence of a large number of zeroes in bilateral migration stocks gives rise to
econometric concerns about possible inconsistent OLS estimates. The most appropri-
ate method to estimate the above model is the Poisson regression by pseudo-maximum
likelihood (PPML). We will use the PPML command in Stata which builds on the
method of Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2011) to identify and drop regressors that may
cause the non-existence of the (pseudo-) maximum likelihood estimates. Standard
errors are robust and clustered by country pairs.
8Note that in the gravity regressions, we consider the comprehensive migration matrices, including
all country pairs.
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A limitation of this instrumentation strategy is that most of our determinants
of bilateral migration stocks are time-invariant. In the panel setting, therefore, we
follow Feyrer (2009) and add time xed-e¤ects and interactions between geographic
distance and time dummies into the "zero-stage" regression (4). Identication comes
from the time-varying e¤ect of geographic distance on migration, reecting gradual
changes in transportation and communication costs. Interactions between time dum-
mies and distance account for common shocks in communication and transportation
technologies (e.g. improvements in aircraft technology have induced more people to
move and have reduced long-distance migration costs). As long as changes in tech-
nologies are common to all countries, these time series changes will be exogenous with
respect to any particular country, but they will have di¤erent e¤ects across country
pairs, depending on the relative geographic position.
Table A.2.a in the Appendix gives the results of the "zero-stage" regression. Col-
umn 1 gives the results of the panel estimation while column 2 gives the cross-sectional
results for the year 2000. Overall, geographic characteristics are strong determinants
of bilateral migration stocks. As proxies of migration costs, linguistic links favor
migration while geographical distance is negatively correlated with bilateral migra-
tion stocks. Past guest-worker programs have a positive e¤ect on bilateral migration
stocks, as does the population size at origin (in absolute terms, bigger countries send
more migrants abroad). In Table A.2.b, it is shown that bmi;t is an excellent predic-
tor of mi;t and the R
2 of this rst-stage regression varies between 0.40 (for the P2
indicator) and 0.56 (for the EF indicator). As in Feyrer (2009), the gravity-based
instrumentation strategy performs quite well in the second stage.
2.2.2 Weather-based 2SLS strategy
Relative geography variables can a¤ect institutions through other channels than mi-
gration, and rst and foremost through trade. While we control for trade ows (as
well as for other important variables) in our second-stage regressions, we cannot ex-
clude that our gravity variables also a¤ect institutions through additional channels
(e.g., cultural proximity, or technology di¤usion).We therefore consider an alternative
IV strategy based on weather shocks in the panel setting.9 While our gravity-based
strategy builds on interactions between distance and time dummies, climatic vari-
ables truly vary over time. In the rst stage, we use the lagged population size in
logs (lnPopi;t 1), lagged number of natural disasters (Natdi;t 1), and lagged devia-
tions in temperature from the country-specic mean values (Tempi;t 1) as external
instruments for the lagged emigration rate. Our rst-stage regression, which includes
Xki;t 1, the set of controls of the second stage, writes as:
mi;t 1 = a
we
0
+awe
1
ln(Pi;t 1)+a
we
2
Natdi;t 1+a
we
3
Tempi;t 1+
X
k
awek X
k
i;t 1+
we
i;t 1 (5)
9We do not implement the weather-based IV strategy in the cross-sectional setting.
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Beine and Parsons (2015) found no direct impact of climatic factors on interna-
tional migration using migration data in 10-year intervals over the period 1960-2000.
On the contrary, Marchiori et al. (2012) and Coniglio and Pesce (2014) identied an
e¤ect on net ows using annual data. Table A.2.c in the Appendix shows that emi-
gration rates decrease with population size and increase with the number of natural
disasters and with temperature shocks when using data in 5-year intervals. Compared
to our gravity-based strategy, the R2 of this rst-stage regression is smaller, ranging
from 0.16 (for the P2 indicator) to 0.33 (for the CL indicator). Still, in the second
stage, the e¤ect of emigration on democracy remains signicant in many cases, and
both short-run and long-run e¤ects are similar to those obtained with the gravity-
based IV strategy. The F-stat of the second stage is much smaller though, sometimes
falling below the 10 percent threshold (for the EF and P2 regressions notably).
We consider our weather-based strategy as a robustness check. Weather shocks
and natural disasters are exogenous and have been used to instrument migration
in several studies (e.g., Munshi, 2003; Yang and Choi, 2007). However, we do not
consider them as perfect instruments as they can be correlated with our dependent
variable. On the one hand, they could a¤ect institutions through income shocks or
through the risk of conicts (Bruckner and Ciccone, 2011; Nel and Righarts, 2008).
On the other hand, more democratic countries might su¤er less from natural disasters
(Kahn, 2005). To partially reduce concerns about exclusion restrictions, we consider
the occurrence, and not the incidence, of natural disasters.
2.2.3 SYS-GMM strategy
As third identication strategy, we use the SYS-GMM estimator with internal instru-
ments only.10 This technique accounts for unobservable heterogeneity, and potential
endogeneity and persistence of the other regressors.
Estimating (2) and (1) requires dening a set of explanatory variables a¤ecting
the quality of institutions. Introducing correlated controls can therefore generate
identication problems among the correlated variables. In a panel setting, we could
solve this problem by controlling for time xed e¤ects, t, and country xed e¤ects,
i. Although they cannot capture determinants that are both country- and time-
specic, such xed-e¤ects account for many unobservable characteristics that jointly
a¤ect emigration and institutions. In our estimation strategy, we do not consider
a within transformation to control for unobserved heterogeneity, because the results
would become too imprecise for several reasons. First, we know that in a dynamic
panel data model, the standard xed e¤ect estimator is biased and inconsistent in
panels with a short time dimension, the so called Nickell bias (Nickell, 1981). Second,
as Hauk and Wacziarg (2009) point out, the within estimator tends to exacerbate the
measurement error bias and to understate the impact of the explanatory variables
10In a previous version of this paper, we also combined internal and external instruments. Results
are similar and are available upon request.
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in dynamic panel data models with regressors that are both time persistent and
measured with errors. This point is particularly crucial if the right-hand-side variables
are highly time persistent, as is the case here. Under xed e¤ect estimation, therefore,
eliminating heterogeneity bias may come at the cost of exacerbating measurement
error bias.11
Under particular assumptions, the SYS-GMM estimator controls for unobserved
heterogeneity and partly corrects for the deciencies of the FE estimator.12 It com-
bines the regression in di¤erences with the regression in levels in a single system. The
instruments used in the rst di¤erentiated equation are the same as in Arellano-Bond
(1991), while the instruments for the equation in level are the lagged di¤erences of
the corresponding variables. SYS-GMM requires an additional moment condition for
the level equation, such that rst di¤erences of pre-determined explanatory variables
must be orthogonal to the country xed e¤ects. This holds when the process is mean
stationary, a di¢cult condition to test. Nevertheless, even when the stationarity
condition is unlikely to be fully statised, Hauk and Wacziarg (2009) show that the
estimation biases of SYS-GMM are systematically smaller in magnitude than those
resulting from weak instruments in the Arellano-Bond approach, or than the Nickell
bias under dynamic xed e¤ects. The validity of the additional moment conditions
associated with the level equation has been tested using the Hansen di¤erence test
for all GMM instruments.
A second advantage of SYS-GMM is that it enables us to deal with the endogeneity
of other regressors using internal instruments. For example, the existing literature
has studied the impact of human capital and development on institutions, however it
is obvious that institutions a¤ect economic performance and the incentives to acquire
human capital. The same issue arises with GDP per capita, trade and foreign aid.
In addition, using the lagged dependent in (1) also induces potential biases in the
estimation. We conduct SYS-GMM estimations with the alternative sets of time-
varying controls (human capital, GDP per capita, trade, and foreign aid), considering
each control as potentially endogenous.
There is neither formal tests nor precise guidance to identify the optimal number
of lags in the SYS-GMM specication. As a rule of thumb, Roodman (2009) suggests
to keep the number of instruments lower than the number of countries. Too many
instruments can in fact over-t the endogenous variables. At the same time, too few
11For example, this can explain why, in the growth literature, human capital variables have often
been found insignicantly di¤erent from zero (or with negative signs) in panel xed-e¤ects applica-
tions (see Islam, 1995). Hauk and Wacziarg (2009) show that Monte Carlo simulations are in line
with these results found in the literature. In addition, even if the model is dynamic they also show
that the rst-di¤erence GMM estimator does not perform better in terms of bias properties. For ex-
ample, the Monte Carlo simulations regarding the e¤ect of human capital accumulation on growth
display very close results to the xed e¤ect estimates, suggesting that the weak instrumentation
problem may be prevalent in this case.
12See also Blundell and Bond (1998), and Bond et al. (2001), who suggest that system GMM is
the most appropriate estimator in dynamic panel data models when time series are very persistent.
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instruments can lead to weak instrumentation problems. In our estimations, each
explanatory variable (with the exception of the time xed e¤ects) will be instrumented
for using its rst to third lags, as in Spilimbergo (2009). However, our results are
fairly robust to the choice of the instruments set.
For each SYS-GMM regression, we report the p-value of the Hansen test for
joint validity of all the instruments. Although SYS-GMM works less well under a
few specications, we keep the same lag structure for all the specications to be
transparent and not to choose ad hoc internal instruments for each specication
and/or indicator.13
The SYS-GMM estimator will also be used to check the robustness of the results
to the inclusion/exclusion of certain countries whose characteristics may exacerbate
reverse causality problems (e.g., socialist countries, sub-Saharan African countries,
oil-exporting countries, and MENA countries) and to examine whether our results
are driven by skill-specic emigration rates.
2.3 Data
Our data set is a ve-year unbalanced panel spanning the period between 1985 and
2010, where the start of the date refers to the dependent variable (i.e., t = 1985,
t 1 = 1980). In our sample, we consider developing countries only (according to the
World Bank Classication in 2008), and they enter the panel if they are independent
at time t   1.14 The country sample is selected on the basis of the availability of
the data. Table 1 provides summary statistics and number of observations for our
dependent and control variables, calculated considering the largest sample that we
use across indicators and estimation techniques.15
13It should also be noticed that the Hansen J-test rests on strong assumptions and can have low
power. See Roodman (2009).
14In our sample, Antigua and Barbuda, Chile, Latvia, Lithuania, Russia and Uruguay are classied
as developing countries. Chile, Lithuania, Russia and Uruguay became high-income countries in
2013. Latvia did it in 2010, and Antigua and Barbuda in 2009. Hungary became a high-income
country in 2008 but slipped back to the upper-middle-income group in 2013.
15Table A.1 in the Appendix presents the list of countries in our sample including the largest
number of observations.
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Table 1. Summary statistics for time-varying variables
Obs. Mean Std dev Min Max
PR index 766 .4779 .3413 .0000 1.000
CL index 766 .4856 .2851 .0000 1.000
EF index 445 .5745 .1150 .1780 .7930
P2 index 654 .5500 .3244 .0000 1.000
Emigration rate 766 .0550 .0967 .0001 .5193
Human capital 568 .0382 .0404 .0006 .2491
GDP per capita (logs) 745 7.819 .9652 5.016 9.811
Trade (as % of GDP) 683 .7620 .4061 .0108 3.587
Net ODA (as % of GNI) 655 .0978 .1307 -.0010 1.451
Note: Samples including developing countries only (see Table A.1.a in the Appendix).
2.3.1 Democracy
Data on democracy are taken from the Freedom House data set, from the Economic
Freedom of the World Project, and from the POLITY IV data set.
The Freedom House publishes the political rights (PR) and civil liberties (CL)
indices. They are based on perception measures gathered through expert coding
based on news reports, NGOs and think tanks evaluations, and surveys administered
to large number of professionals. For the PR index, the questions are grouped into
three sub-categories: electoral processes, political pluralism and participation, and
functioning of the government. The CL questions are grouped into four subcategories:
freedom of expression and belief; association and organization rights; rule of law and
personal autonomy; and individual rights. The sum of each countrys sub-category
scores translates to a rating from 1 to 7, with a higher score indicating more freedom.
Following Acemoglu et al. (2008) we transform these indices so that they lie between
0 and 1, with 1 corresponding to the most-democratic set of institutions.
We also consider Economic Freedom of the World (EFW), an index which mea-
sures the degree to which countries policies and institutions support economic free-
dom. Five broad areas are distinguished: (1) size of government; (2) legal structure
and security of property rights; (3) access to sound money; (4) freedom to trade in-
ternationally; and (5) regulation of credit, labor and business. The index is placed
on a scale from 0 to 10. We also normalize it between 0 and 1.16 The ratings are
determined by combining real indicators (such as "size of governement", taken from
the IMF) with answers to survey questions on other modules (such as "independence
of the judicial system", taken from perception reports  e.g., the Global Competi-
tiveness Report form the World Economic Forum, or "regulatory restrictions" taken
from the World Banks "Doing Business" database).
16It should be noticed that EFW is a continuos index, and there are no countries that has a grade
of 0 or 10. In order to normalize this index, we simply divided the original index by 10.
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Finally, another measure of democracy from the POLITY IV data set is also con-
sidered. Polity IV indicators of democracy measure the general openness of political
institutions and combine several aspects such as: the presence of institutions and
procedures through which citizens can express e¤ective preferences about alternative
policies and leaders; the existence of institutionalized constraints on the exercise of
power by the executive power; and the guarantee of civil liberties to all citizens in
their daily lives and in acts of political participation. In our data set we consider a
composite index (Polity2), that ranges from -10 to + 10. This index is also normalized
between 0 and 1. Note that while the "political rights", "civil liberties" and "eco-
nomic freedom of the world" indices are largely based on public perception measures
and can therefore be seen as a reection of contemporaneous de facto institutional
quality, the Polity 2 indicator is based on expert coding of legal documents and can
therefore be interpreted more as a de jure measure.17
Table 2 presents the correlation table between the various institutional indicators.
The rst three indices (PR, CL, Polity2) exhibit pairwise correlation rates between
0.8 and 0.9; their correlation rate with EFW is around 0.45.
Table 2. Correlation rates between democracy indicators
PR CL EF P2
PR 1.000 - - -
CL .8852 1.000 - -
EF .4162 .4850 1.000 -
P2 .8402 .7904 .4647 1.000
2.3.2 Emigration
For emigration data, we use the IAB database (Bruecker et al., 2013). Focusing on
20 OECD destination countries, they computed emigration stocks and rates of the
population aged 25 years and older by gender and educational attainment in ve-year
intervals from 1980 to 2010, i.e. seven data points per country of origin.
Two alternative databases are worth mentioning: Ozden et al. (2011), and Artuç
et al. (2015). They cover more destinations but less data points per country of
origin. Ozden et al. (2011) provide data from 1960 to 2000 in ten-year intervals for
the whole population of migrants (including children). Given the availability of our
democracy indicators, using this database would limit the number of data points per
country to three (1980, 1990 and 2000) in the dynamic panel framework. Artuç et al.
(2015) only provide data from 1990 and 2000 (henceforth referred to as the ADOP
database). Still, in our cross-sectional setting, we will estimate our model using more
comprehensive emigration rates (to all OECD destinations, and also to all countries
of the world) from Artuç et al. (2015) and for the year 2000. This will enable us to
17It goes without saying that there is a good deal of discrepancy between de facto and de jure
indicators. See Hallward-Driemeier and Pritchett (2011) in the case of the "Doing Business" data.
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increase coverage and to distinguish between emigration to OECD versus non-OECD
destinations.
The IAB data were obtained by harmonizing national censuses and population reg-
isters from the receiving countries. When building their large-scale data set, Bruecker
et al. (2013) had to deal with inevitable gaps in the data. As in the other databases,
interpolations and/or imputations were used when census data were missing or were
not su¢ciently detailed to identify the bilateral stocks of migrants. This is a less
important issue in our context as we use aggregate emigration rates and (bilateral)
missing values are scarce for the major OECD destinations. Comparing IAB data
with those from Artuç et al. (2015), the 20 destination countries covered represent
more than 90 percent of the OECD total immigration stock. In addition, the correla-
tion between the IAB and ADOPmeasures of emigration stocks to the 20 destinations
equals 0.986 for the year 2000.
2.3.3 Other data
Data on human capital are based on Barro and Lee (2013) and concern the population
aged 25 and over, in line with emigration data. Some regressions in the Appendix will
exploit the human capital indicators of the IAB database, where the levels of educa-
tion in countries for which the Barro and Lees data are missing are imputed. Data
on GDP per capita, population, trade, and o¢cial development assistance (ODA) are
taken from the Penn World Tables and from the World Development Indicators. Data
on legal origins are from La Porta et al. (1999), who provide a set of time-invariant
binary variables characterizing the origin of national law.18 Ethnic fractionalization
data are taken from Alesina et al. (2003). Latitude, prevalence of malaria and other
geographic and cultural bilateral data are taken from the CEPII database and from
Sachs (2003), respectively. Data on natural disasters are obtained from the EMDAT-
database whereas monthly data on temperature are taken from Mitchell et al. (2003).
The EMDAT database provides the number of natural disasters, the total number
of deaths, the number of a¤ected people, and damages in US$. To partially reduce
concerns regarding violations of the exclusion restriction, we consider the number of
natural disasters and we disregard their incidence. We aggregate natural disasters by
periods of ve years. As for temperature, we average the levels over periods of ve
years and expressed them in percentage of deviation from the 1975-2010 average, as
in Beine and Parsons (2015).
3 Results
The results are organized in ve sub-sections. We rst use cross-sectional data to
estimate the long-run relationship between emigration and institutional quality de-
18Five systems are distinguished: French, German, British, Scandinavian and Socialist.
16
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
picted in (2) using the OLS and 2SLS regressions with external instruments. Second,
we use panel data to estimate dynamic specication (1) with pooled OLS and 2SLS
regressions under two sets of external instruments: gravity-based instruments, and
weather shocks. Third, we re-estimate our dynamic model using the SYS-GMM esti-
mator with internal instruments. Fourth, we conduct a sensitivity analysis to check
the robustness of our results to the exclusion of certain groups of countries (socialist
countries, oil-producing countries, sub-Saharan African countries, and MENA coun-
tries) and to the exclusion of some periods. Finally, we estimate the dynamic model
using skill-specic emigration rates to investigate whether the e¤ect of emigration on
institutions varies by education level. In the last two sub-sections, we only rely on
the SYS-GMM estimator. In all cases, the analysis is conducted on four institutional
indicators: the Freedom House indicators of political rights (PR) and civil liberties
(CL), the index of Economic Freedom of the World (EF), and the Polity 2 index (P2).
3.1 Cross-sectional analysis
Tables 3 reports OLS and 2SLS estimates for specication (2) using data for 2000 for
all variables.19 We only report the estimated coe¢cients of the emigration rate and
their standard errors, which are robust and clustered by country. In OLS regressions
(column 1), the estimated coe¢cient of the emigration rate is positive and statistically
signicant for each indicator. In columns 2, we correct for endogeneity using the
gravity-based 2SLS strategy, introducing various controls separately in columns 3 to
10, and all of them jointly in column 11.
The baseline regressions in column 1 shows that the emigration coe¢cient is pos-
itive and statistically signicant for all democracy indicators. Compared with OLS,
the 2SLS coe¢cients are larger, suggesting that OLS coe¢cients might su¤er from a
reverse causality bias: emigration rates decrease when institutions improve (particu-
larly when political rights and civil liberties improve).
In columns 3 to 10, we add our eight controls one at a time to avoid collinearity
problems. Estimated coe¢cients for control variables are provided in Tables A.3.a to
A.3.d in the Appendix. The share of tertiary educated residents is always positive and
signicant for each indicator, with exception of the Economic Freedom of the World
(EF) index. The number of observations drastically decreases when human capital is
included (from 138 to 99 observations). The coe¢cient of GDP per capita is always
positive and signicant. It is worth noticing that we do not instrument our control
variables. Hence, we only identify correlation relationships between democracy and
our controls. In most cases, the coe¢cients of trade, net ODA, ethnic fractionalization
and legal dummies are not signicant with the exception of the EF indicator, which
decreases with ethnic fractionalization and with foreign aid. Geographic variables
and regional dummies are usually signicant.
19We consider the year 2000 as we will use alternative measures of emigration rates available for
that year. The results are robust to using other years.
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We nd that the e¤ect of emigration on political rights and civil liberties is strongly
robust to the inclusion of standard control variables. Adding these controls does
not a¤ect the signicance and the size of the emigration coe¢cient. In addition,
the Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk (KP) F-statistic for weak identication appears to be
very large in all specications, except when human capital or geographic controls
are included. In the rst case, the sample size drastically decreases. In the second
case, geographical variables are correlated with the explanatory variables used in our
"zero-stage" gravity model: the quality of the rst-stage strongly decreases when
geography is included. However, the KP F-statistic value is higher than the critical
values reported by Stock and Yogo (2005) although lies below the most demanding
one (16.38).20
The e¤ect of emigration on the EF indicator is also stable, except when geo-
graphic controls are included. As far as the Polity 2 index is concerned, the e¤ect
of emigration is less robust; we lose signicance under three specications. As ex-
pected, the regression including all controls (column 11) is problematic: the number
of observations and the KP F-stat decrease, and many coe¢cients are inated due to
multicollinearity.
Globally, Table 3 is suggestive of a positive and robust causal e¤ect of emigration
on the de facto indicators of democracy. Similar e¤ects are found for political insti-
tutions and economic institutions, with long-run e¤ects ranging between 1.6 and 2.2
for the PR index, and between 1.8 and 2.4 for the CL index. Overall, this means that
a 10-percentage point increase in the emigration rate raises standardized democracy
indices by 16 to 24 percentage points in PR and CL, that is, by 47 to 84 percent of
their standard deviations as reported in Table 1. The e¤ect on the P2 index, our de
jure indicator of democracy, is much less stable and sometimes insignicant. Regard-
ing the EF index, the long-run e¤ect ranges only from .4 to .5, implying that a 10
percentage-point increase in emigration raises the index by 4 to 5 percentage points
(that is, by 15 percent of its standard deviation).
The IAB emigration rates are based on census data collected in 20 OECD desti-
nation countries. Although these countries represent about 90 percent of the foreign-
born population living in OECD countries in 2000, we also estimated our cross-
sectional model using the comprehensive measures of migration from ADOP for the
year 2000.21 In Table 4, we depart from the parsimonious specications 1 and 2 of
20To test for the quality of our instruments we consider the framework provided by Stock and Yogo
(2005), which is a generalization of the well-known Staiger-Stock rule-of-thumb of a value of 10.
The null being tested is that instruments are weak in the sense that IV estimates provide hypothesis
tests with large size distortions. With one endogenous variable and one excluded instrument, the
Stock and Yogo (2005) critical values (maximal IV size) are: 16.38 (10% maximal IV size); 8.96 (15%
maximal IV size); 6.66 ( 20% maximal IV size); 5.53 (25% maximal IV size). Note that the Stock
and Yogo critical values are only strictly appropriate when errors are IID. However, it is common
to use them as a guideline also in the presence of non-IID errors.
21We identied countries for which the IAB dataset accounts for less than 70 percent of total
emigration to OECD in the year 2000. These include 23 countries (Azerbaijan, Belarus, Brazil,
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Table 3 and re-estimate the model using the ADOP emigration rates to 20 OECD
countries, to 34 OECD countries, and to non-OECD countries. It is worth noticing
that migration to non-OECD destinations accounts for 42.2 percent of the stock of
migrants aged 25 and over and originating from developing countries. Columns 1
to 5 show the OLS results. Columns 6 to 10 show the 2SLS results obtained with
gravity-based instruments.22 Results are only provided for the PR index.23
For each de facto indicator of democracy, very similar OLS and 2SLS results are
obtained when using alternative (and more comprehensive) emigration rates to OECD
countries. The coe¢cient is slightly smaller with the ADOP data because we divide
total emigration stocks by di¤erent measures of the native population. On the con-
trary, emigration to non-OECD (i.e. less democratic countries) is never signicant.
Hence, restricting the sample of destination countries to 20 OECD member states
and disregarding non-OECD destinations is not a limitation. In line with Spilim-
bergo (2009), we conclude that what matters for institutions is the emigration rate
to democratic states. As far as Polity 2 is concerned, emigration to OECD countries
remains positive and highly signicant, whereas emigration to non-OECD is negative
and signicant. We do not want to push the interpretation of this result too far as
estimation for the Polity 2 index will be less stable in the panel frameworks with
external and internal instruments.
3.2 Panel analysis with 2SLS
Table 5 reports pooled OLS and 2SLS estimates for dynamic specication (1). Stan-
dard errors are robust and clustered by country. Compared to the cross-section
regressions, we now control for the level of the lagged dependent variable and use
panel data in 5-year intervals. The pooled OLS regression in column 1 conrms that
institutional indicators are persistent and positively correlated with the emigration
rates. In columns 2 to 11, we provide 2SLS results with our gravity-based instru-
mentation strategy. The latter builds on Feyrer (2009) and consists in introducing
time dummies and interactions between these dummies and the log of distance in our
pseudo-gravity regression.
Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Dem. Rep. of Congo, Rep. of Congo, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyr-
gyzstan, Libya, Lithuania, Moldova, Morocco, Romania, Russia, Rwanda, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan,
Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Yemen). Most of them are Socialist or Sub-Saharan African countries that
will be excluded in our robustness analyses. In unreported regressions (available from the authors
upon request), we estimated the model without these 23 countries and obtained very similar results.
22To construct instruments, we run gravity regressions with di¤erent samples of destination coun-
tries (20 OECD, 34 OECD, or all non-OECD destinations).
23Regression results for the other indicators are provided in Tables A.4.a to A.4.d of the Appendix.
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We gradually add our sets of controls following the same structure as in Table 3.
We only report the estimated coe¢cients of the lagged dependent and of the emigra-
tion rate.24 The share of tertiary educated residents and the level of GDP per capita
are always positive and signicant for each indicator. Depending on the specication,
the coe¢cient for the lagged dependent usually varies between .75 and .80. This
means that it takes 14 to 17 years (2.77 to 3.47 periods of 5 years) to close half of
the gap with the long-run level of institutional quality when a shock occurs.25 Our
2SLS results therefore conrm a positive causal e¤ect of emigration on institutions.
This is the case for all indicators except the Polity 2 index, conrming our prior
on de facto versus de jure democracy. As in the cross-sectional analysis, the coe¢-
cient of emigration increases when emigration is instrumented, reecting the reverse
causality problem of the OLS estimates. The KP F-stat of our second stage is always
very large. The smallest levels are obtained when geographic controls are included
(as in the cross-sectional framework, geographic controls are strongly correlated with
the distance variables used in the pseudo-gravity, "zero-stage" regression) and, to a
lesser extent, when human capital is included (which causes a drop in the number of
observations, from 766 to 568). However, in this last case, the KP F-stat is larger
than the most demanding Stock-Yogo critical value of 16.38 (10% maximal IV size).
The magnitude of the coe¢cient (i.e., the short-run e¤ect) varies between .35
and .55 for the Freedom House index of political rights (PR), between .20 and .40
for the Freedom House index of civil liberties (CL), between .08 to .12 only for the
index of Economic Freedom of the World (EF), and is rarely signicant for Polity 2
(P2). This means, for example, that a 10-percentage point change in the emigration
rate increases the PR index by 3.5 to 5.5 percent in the short-run. Estimation of
the dynamic specication conrms that larger e¤ects are found for perceived (de
facto) levels of democracy than for the de jure indicator P2. Given (2), the long-run
e¤ects are obtained by multiplying the short-run coe¢cient by (1  ) 1), i.e. by
4 to 5 depending on the specication. Remarkably, the implied long-run e¤ects are
almost identical to those obtained in the cross-sectional setting. For example, a 10-
percentage point increase in the emigration rate increases the PR index by 16 to 22
percent in the long-run, that is, by 47 to 64 percent of the standard deviation, as in
the cross sectional framework. The long-run e¤ect on the CL index is slightly smaller
than in cross-section, ranging from 12 to 21 percent (i.e., 42 to 74 percent of the
standard deviation), but in the same order of magnitude. The long-run e¤ect on the
EF index is in line with cross-sectional results, ranging from 3 to 5 percent (i.e., 13 to
21 percent of the standard deviation). The only di¤erence is that we lose signicance
for the Polity 2 index. As usual, the regression including all controls (column 11) is
problematic, due to multicollinearity.
24Estimated coe¢cients for control variables are provided in Tables A.5.a to A.5.d in the Appendix.
25In a dynamic model such as (1), the number of periods that a country needs to close x percent
of the gap between its curent level of democracy and the steady state can be proxied by  ln(1  
x)=(1  ).
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As a robustness check, Tables 6 reports pooled OLS and 2SLS estimates when
weather-based instruments are used. We follow exactly the same structure as in Tables
3 and 5. Although the R2 of the rst stage remains above .30 for the PR and CL
index, it falls to .23 for the EF index and to .16 for the P2 index.26 Consequently, the
KP F-stat of the rst stage is poor for the EF and P2 regressions, thus indicating a
weak instrumentation problem. Nevertheless, weather shocks are generally relevant
instruments for the Freedom House indices of political rights (PR) and civil liberties
(CL), with the exceptions of columns 3, 9, and consequently, 11 (specication with
all the controls), where we are not able to reject the null of weak instruments. This
is because geographic controls in column 9 are too highly correlated with natural
disasters, and human capital in column 3 kills the e¤ect of weather shocks in the
rst stage; the KP F-stat falls to 4.11.27 For all the other columns, the KP F-stat
is always above the least demanding Stock and Yogo critical values (and in general
above/close to the traditional rule of thumb of 10).28
Focusing on the PR and CL indices, the overidentication test for the validity
of instruments (Hansen J test) is satised in all specications. The short-run e¤ect
with weather-based instruments varies between .55 and .65 for the Freedom House
index of political rights (PR), between .45 and .55 for the Freedom House index of
civil liberties (CL). The coe¢cient for the lagged dependent is very stable and varies
between .77 and .78. Again, long-run e¤ects of emigration on the PR and CL indices
of democracy are in the same order of magnitude albeit greater as in the previous
settings. For example, a 10-percentage point increase in the emigration rate increases
the PR index by 24 to 28 percent in the long-run (i.e., 70 to 82 percent of the standard
deviation), and increases the CL index by 19 to 24 percent (i.e., 67 to 84 percent of
the standard deviation).
26Table A.2.c in the Appendix shows the results of the rst-stage regressions (5) when controls
are not included. Estimated coe¢cients for control variables are provided in Tables A.6.a to A.6.d.
27The latter results is caused by the drop in the number of observations (from 766 to 568). If
we use the IAB imputed levels of education for the missing countries and re-estimate the model
for political norms, the KP F-stat reaches 10.4. Interestingly, the coe¢cient of the emigration rate
equals .6976 and becomes signicant at the one percent level; the coe¢cient of human capital equals
.2512 but is only signicant at the 10 percent level. These results are available upon request.
28With one endogenous variables, and 3 excluded instruments, the critical values are: 22.30 (10%
maximal IV size); 12.83 (15% maximal IV size); 9.54 (20% maximal IV size); 7.80 (25% maximal
IV size).
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3.3 Panel analysis with SYS-GMM
Tables 7 reports SYS-GMM estimates for dynamic specication (1). One advantage
of this method is that it accounts for the endogeneity of all regressors, including the
lagged dependent. In Column 1, we consider the parsimonious specication without
controls. In columns 2 to 5, we add four sets of time-varying controls (human capital,
the log of GDP per capita, trade and foreign aid as percentage of GDP), treat all
explanatory variables as predetermined and instrument them using their rst to third
lags.29 We do not control for time invariant variables (ethnic fractionalization, legal
origin, geography and regional dummies) as the SYS-GMM estimator accounts for
unobserved heterogeneity. Standard errors are robust and clustered by country group.
The SYS-GMM analysis conrms the cross-sectional and panel results obtained
with the 2SLS methods. The coe¢cient for the lagged dependent varies between .70
and .77. This means that it takes 12 to 15 years (2.3 to 3.0 periods of 5 years) to
close half the gap with the long-run level of institutional quality when a shock occurs.
Importantly, our SYS-GMM estimates for emigration remain positive and statistically
signicant at usual signicance levels, except for the (de jure) Polity 2 index. In the
SYS-GMM setting, the short-run e¤ects of emigration are identical to those obtained
with the 2SLS estimator. The estimated coe¢cient of emigration varies between .20
and .37 for the Freedom House index of political rights (PR), between .17 and .42 for
the Freedom House index of civil liberties (CL), and between .11 to .17 for the index
of Economic Freedom of the World (EF).
It is worth noticing that the size of the coe¢cient and its signicance level are
smaller when human capital is accounted for, in spite of the fact that human capital
is weakly signicant. This is mainly because the inclusion of human capital drasti-
cally reduces the number of observations (from 766 to 568 observations). In Tables
A.8 in the Online Appendix, we compare results obtained with alternative measures
of human capital taken from the Barro and Lees database (i.e. the proportions of
individuals with primary schooling in columns 2 and 3, with secondary schooling in
columns 4 and 5, and with tertiary schooling in columns 6 and 7) for the PR indi-
cator. Results obtained with primary and secondary education are never signicant,
independently of whether emigration is included in the regression. Hence, the insignif-
icance of these variables is not driven by the collinearity with emigration rates. The
best specication is the one including the proportion of college-educated, although
this variable is signicant at the 10 percent threshold only. In the last column of
Table A.8, we exploit the human capital indicators of the IAB database, which im-
putes the levels of education in countries where Barro and Lees data are missing.
Compared to the parsimonious specication of column 1, this leaves the number of
observations and the estimated coe¢cients of the emigration rate unchanged, while
human capital becomes insignicant.
29Estimated coe¢cients for control variables are provided in Tables A.7.a to A.7.d in the Appendix.
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Recall that the literature on education and democracy is inconclusive: while Ace-
moglu et al. (2008) found that education has no explanatory power for democracy,
Bobba and Coviello (2007), Castello-Climent (2008) and Murtin and Wacziarg (2013)
found a positive and signicant e¤ect. Our results suggest that the e¤ect might be
there but does not prove to be highly robust to specication choices and instrumen-
tation strategies.30
Long-run e¤ects of emigration are in the same order of magnitude, albeit slighlty
smaller (due to a smaller coe¢cient for the lagged dependent) than in the 2SLS cross-
sectional and panel frameworks. Using results from the parsimonious specication,
a 10-percentage point change in the emigration rate increases the PR, CL and EF
indices respectively by 13, 12 and 6 percentage points in the long-run (i.e., respectively
38, 42 and 26 percent of the relevant standard deviations). The AR(2) row tests the
null hypothesis that the error term does not exhibit second-order serial correlation.
The Hansen J-test of overindentifying restrictions and the di¤erence Hansen test
indicate that the moment conditions are satised and the instruments are valid in
most regressions, with exception of the CL index. Although, for CL, the test works
better under alternative lag structures, we have used a common lag structure for all
specications for transparency reasons.31
3.4 Robustness by sub-sample
The above results suggest that emigration positively a¤ected institutional quality in
developing countries between 1980 and 2010. In this section, we conduct three sets
of robustness checks. The results are presented in Table 8 for the Freedom House
Political Rights Index (PR).
First, we investigate whether our results could be driven by the inclusion of coun-
tries sharing specic characteristics. Building on the parsimonious specication (1)
in Table 7, we re-estimate the model using four alternative samples of countries and
relying on the SYS-GMM estimator. We rst exclude socialist countries (dened on
the basis of the legal origin dummy) in columns 1. The rationale for doing this is that
emigration was legally restricted in these countries prior to the transition while the fall
of the Berlin wall drastically a¤ected the evolution of institutions and of emigration
patterns. One may also be concerned by the fact that the pre- and post-transition
trajectories of human capital have been peculiar in socialist countries (see Acemoglu
et al., 2005). We exclude sub-Saharan African countries in column 2. Sub-Saharan
30This could be due to di¤erences in time coverage: Castello-Climent (2008) considered the 1965-
2000 period in 5-year intervals. Murtin and Wacziarg (2014) used data from 1870 to 2000 in 10-year
intervals; they conducted robustness checks by sub-periods but their shortest period goes from 1960
to 2000.
31For instance, in the specication without additional controls, instrumenting the lagged depen-
dent and the emigration rate with their third to fth lags, we obtain (i) statistically signicant
results for both the lagged dependent and the total emigration rate, (ii) a Hansen test p-value of
0.233, and (iii) a di¤erence Hansen test p-value of 0.133.
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African countries are on average less stable politically than the other countries in our
sample. We exclude oil-exporting countries in column 3. Several studies have pointed
out a negative correlation between oil exports (and of natural-resource dependence in
general) and democracy (see Ross, 2001; Tsui, 2011). We exclude MENA countries
(Middle East and Northern Africa) in column 4. These countries are mostly popu-
lated by Muslims, and the proportion of Muslims has often been used as a control
variable in the literature (Castello-Climent, 2008; La Porta et al., 1999). These four
groups all exhibit average emigration rates below the full sample 5.5 percent mean
(3.4 percent in socialist countries, 2.3 percent in sub-Saharan Africa, 2.3 percent in
oil producing countries, and 3.4 percent in the MENA region).
The estimated coe¢cient for emigration is always positive and highly signicant in
all sub-samples. The long-run e¤ect of a 10-percentage point increase in emigration on
PR varies between 11 and 13 percentage points (i.e., 32 to 42 percent of the standard
deviation), which is clearly in line with the full-sample results. As discussed above,
the 20-destination IAB database imperfectly captures the emigration from Socialist
and Sub-Saharan African countries. These mismeasurement issues do not a¤ect our
main ndings.
Second, one of the assumptions of the SYS-GMM estimator is that rst di¤erences
of predetermined explanatory variables are orthogonal to the xed e¤ects, which im-
ply that the series in level have constant correlation over time with individual xed
e¤ects (Bun and Saradis, 2013). Bun and Saradis (2013) provide an alternative
specication of the constant correlated e¤ects assumption, which is that deviations
of the initial in-sample conditions from the respective steady state behaviour are not
systematically related to the level of the steady state itself. In our case, this assump-
tion can be questioned if the secular trends in democratic quality and in emigration
rates follow highly non-monotonic dynamics. One way to alleviate these concerns
is to check the robustness of our results using subsamples in terms of the length of
the observation period thus changing both the length and the in-sample initial con-
ditions. In columns 5 and 8, we estimate the model after eliminating the rst or last
time series observation, respectively. The estimated coe¢cient of the emigration rate
remains positive and highly signicant with a quite stable coe¢cient. The long-run
e¤ect of a 10-percentage point increase in emigration on PR is around 11 percentage
points in both cases (i.e., 32 percent of the standard deviations). In columns 6 and 7,
we eliminate the rst two and last two periods, respectively. Although the number of
observations falls, the e¤ect of emigration remains positive and signicant, however
the Hansen J test and the Di¤erence Hansen test are weaker (but still suggests that
our instruments are valid at the 5% signicance level).32
32Results do not change if we consider the same number of countries (138) across the di¤erent
sample periods.
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Finally, it could be argued that using an unbalanced panel is problematic as coun-
tries are included in the sample after gaining independence, which might coincide with
an episode of democratization. In column 9, we therefore estimate our model using
a fully balanced sample. Again, the e¤ect of emigration is positive and signicant.
The long-run e¤ect of a 10-percentage point increase in emigration on PR equals 11
percentage points.
3.5 Testing for skill-specic e¤ects
Finally, we explore whether the e¤ect of emigration could be governed by the edu-
cation level of emigrants (and not only by their number). This means that we allow
for the e¤ect of emigration in (1) to vary with the education level of emigrants. The
technology becomes:
Ii;t =  + Ii;t 1 + 

mHi;t 1 + m
L
i;t 1

+
X
k
kX
k
i;t 1 + "i;t (6)
where mHi;t 1 measures the emigration rate of individuals with tertiary education and
mLi;t 1 is that of the less educated; the parameter  captures the relative e¤ectiveness
of low-skilled emigrants in promoting democracy compared with the highly-skilled.
We use the SYS-GMM estimator. We start from the parsimonious specication
including only the lagged dependent and the total emigration rate (see Column 1 of
Table 7). We only provide results for the PR index in Table 9.
Our main strategy to capture potential heterogeneous e¤ects for di¤erent types
of migrants consists in splitting the total emigration rate by education level. More
precisely, we compute skill-specic emigration rates (mHi;t 1 and m
L
i;t 1) by dividing
the number of high-skill and low-skill emigrants by the total native population aged
25 and over. We use the same denominator as in our computation of the total emi-
gration rate.33 We include mHi;t 1 and m
L
i;t 1 separetely in columns 2 and 3, and nd
estimated coe¢cients of .8447 and .4720, respectively. Nevertheless, we cannot infer
from these regressions that high-skill emigration has a greater impact on democracy
than low-skill emigration. Indeed, the data reveal that mHi;t 1 and m
L
i;t 1 are linked by
a relationship of proportionality.34 If mLi;t 1 ' 2m
H
i;t 1 (as in our sample), this means
that

mHi;t 1 + m
L
i;t 1

is alternatively equal to mHi;t 1(1+2) and to m
L
i;t 1(1+2)=2.
Regressing democracy on high-skill emigration gives a coe¢cient, (1 + 2), that
should be twice as large as the one obtained from the regression of democracy on
low-skill migration, (1+2)=2. Hence, nothing can be inferred from the comparison
between columns 2 and 3. In our dataset, mHi;t 1 and m
L
i;t 1 exhibit a correlation of
about 80 percent. Although it is not recommended to include them jointly in the
same regression, we did so for completeness in column 4 of Table 9. High-skill em-
igration loses signicance whereas the e¤ect of low-skill emigration increases but is
33These variables are denoted by L:Emig:Low and L:Emig:High in Tables 9.
34See Figure A.1 in the Appendix.
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only signicant at 5 percent.
Comparing the benchmark regression on mi;t 1 (column 1) to that on m
H
i;t 1 (col-
umn 2), however, is instructive. If  is close to one (i.e. same e¤ectiveness of high-
skill and low-skill emigration), the emigration coe¢cient in the second regression,
(1 + 2), should be approximately three times as large as , the coe¢cient in the
rst regression. Using the same reasoning, the coe¢cient of the regression with low-
skill emigration, (1 + 2)=2, should be approximately 1.5 times as large as . This
is exactly what Table 9 reveals. At rst glance, this suggests that high-skill and
low-skill emigration exert a similar impact on institutions. This does not mean that
the selection of emigrants cannot inuence the quality of institutions through other
channels. As high-skill emigration rates are twice as large as the low-skill ones, em-
igration reduces the stock of human capital of the origin country and this could be
detrimental to democracy. However, our analysis reveals that the direct e¤ect of hu-
man capital does not prove to be robust to specication choices and instrumentation
strategies. Hence, we cannot conclude that positive selection in emigration is harm-
ful to democracy. This result is conrmed by the regression in columns 5 and 6, in
which we interact the total emigration rate with the proportion of highly-educated or
low-skilled individuals among emigrants. The coe¢cients of these interaction terms,
L:Share:High and L:Share:Low, are insignicant. Altogether, the results do not
support the existence of heterogeneous e¤ects across skill groups.
In addition, we also considered sub-samples excluding the countries with the high-
est shares of both high-skill and low-skill emigrants. Unreported results show that the
e¤ect of emigration increases when we drop the quartile of countries with the highest
shares of college graduates among emigrants, and conversely if we drop the quartile
of countries with the lowest shares. However, we cannot infer from these results that
less educated emigrants are more e¤ective at improving institutions. Indeed, elimi-
nating the top and bottom quartiles based on a di¤erent criterion (GDP per capita,
or level of democracy) gives similar results: the e¤et of emigration is greater in poor
countries with initially bad institutional quality. Rather, we conclude that the e¤ect
of emigration is non linear, a result conrmed in column 7 of Table 9 where we in-
troduce an interaction term between emigration and the lagged dependent variable.
The benecial e¤ect of emigration on democracy decreases with the lagged level of
democracy itself.
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4 Conclusion
This paper empirically investigates the overall impact of emigration on institutions in
a large sample of developing countries. We nd that openness to migration (measured
by the total emigration rate) contributes to improve institutional quality (as measured
by standard indicators of democracy and economic freedom) in the migrants origin
countries. Interestingly, this result holds for our three (out of four) indicators that
can be considered as indicators of de facto institutional quality (the Freedom Houses
"Polical Rights" and "Civil Liberties" indicators, and the Simon Fraser Institutes
"Economic Freedom of the World" indicator), but not for the "Polity 2" indicator of
the Polity IV Project, an indicator of de jure institutional quality.
Overall the results appear quite robust across specications and estimation meth-
ods. They are also robust to the use of di¤erent sub-samples of countries (e.g.,
excluding oil-producing countries, former socialist countries, or sub-Saharan coun-
tries), time-periods (e.g., excluding the rst or last sub-periods) and migrants type
(skilled versus unskilled). Remarkably, the cross-sectional estimates are fully in line
with the implied long-run relationship obtained from dynamic panel regressions. In
terms of magnitude of the coe¢cients, the dynamic panel regressions give a short-run
e¤ect around .4 to .5, quite stable across specications; given that the coe¢cient of
the lag-dependent is .7, this gives a long-run e¤ect of 1.5 to 2, very similar to the
one obtained in the cross-section. In other words, a ten percentage point increase in
the emigration rate increases the main indicators of institutional quality by about 5
percentage point in the short-run and 15 to 20 percentage points in the long run (i.e.,
45 to 60 percent of the standard deviation of the relevant democracy indicator).
Finally, we note that our main result is fully driven by emigration to rich, highly
democratic countries, suggesting that the e¤ect of emigration on home-country insti-
tutional outcomes is destination-specic. Indeed, when we use alternative migration
data sources allowing to disentangle the e¤ect of emigration to OECD versus non-
OECD destinations, the e¤ect of emigration to the latter is virtually zero. We there-
fore conclude that emigration to liberal democracies played an important positive
role in determining institutional and political change in developing countries.
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Highlights 
 
· We model the effect of emigration on institutional quality in developing countries. 
· We empirically show that openness to emigration promotes democratization at home. 
· The effect is fully driven by emigration to rich, highly democratic countries. 
· The result holds mostly for de facto indicators of institutional quality. 
 
